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would fail to realize the Supreme Court's objective of uniform treatment of railroad collective-bargaining agreements, but the NRAB, too, is not beyond reproach in this respect. Outweighing this disadvantage is the desirability, if not
necessity, of ensuring a fair hearing and equal justice to all employees.
Uniformity and fairness could both be achieved under the Slocum rule were
the NRAB reconstituted as an impartial tribunal"'8 It could combine the procedural and adjudicative advantages of a court with the specialized knowledge
of an administrative agency. It could provide a hearing for third parties and
accept inter-employee disputes without upsetting the balance of interests among
its members. It could follow precedents and render consistent interpretations,
and it could decide all the cases on their merits. It could dispense with the
present time-consuming practice of rearguing deadlocked cases before referees.
The carrier members have always favored such a tribunal, but the labor
members are opposed.-09 One reason for their opposition is clear-under the
present set-up, the unions they represent enjoy important advantages over
competing unions. But the interest of railway labor as a whole must lie with an
impartial administration of collective bargaining agreements rather than with
a system which operates to the advantage of vested union interests1o In the
absence of such a sweeping legislative reform, the Supreme Court in the Slocum
case would seem to have done collective bargaining in the railroad industry a
distinct disservice.
SPECIAL FINDINGS AND GENERAL VERDICTS
THE RECONCILIATION DOCTRINE
Legal philosophy has retreated from its former exaltation of trial by jury
as the bulwark of Anglo-American jurisprudence' to a new position, from
x08
A system of labor courts has been proposed, but their jurisdiction was to include compulsory arbitration of disputes over new contracts as well as enforcement of existing agreements. See Vickery, Labor Relations Law: The Ferguson-Smith Bill to Create Labor Courts,
33 A.B.A.J. 548 (1947).
lo9
Jones, op. cit. supra note 37, at 115.

10For contrary views see authority cited note 4o supra, at 9; Collective Bargaining,
Grievance Adjustment, and the Rival Union, 17 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (195o).
The former authority suggests that effective majority rule may require that the interests
of the majority govern the disposition of adjustments as well as the negotiation of new agreements. On this theory the man at the head of the seniority list would not be entitled to complain if removed, because his removal benefits all the employees below him on the list. It
should be added that this authority also states the arguments against exclusive right in the
bargaining agent to represent employees in adjustment proceedings, and makes no final
choice between the two alternatives. In Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945)

the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the theory that the RLA conferred such an exclusive
right on the elected bargaining agent.
xNote in this connection, the classic statement of Blackstone: 'hen the jury have delivered in their verdict, and it is recorded in court, they are then discharged. And so ends the
trial by jury; which ever has been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the
English law." 3 Bl. Comm. *378.
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which it views this institution far more critically. 2 In particular, the value of
the jury system in civil cases has been seriously questioned.3 For the practical
businessman as well as the lawyer, the essence of the law lies in its predictability. Security of transactions is the modem watchword, a standard which
leaves no room for jury verdicts rendered in unintelligent or capricious, and
therefore unpredictable fashion.4
It has long been recognized that the general verdict is, by its very nature,
vulnerable to the caprice of the jury.5 From the time the judge tenders his instructions until the jury returns with its finding, its operations are almost completely hidden from view. 6 The elements which have gone into the jury's verdict are inscrutable and unknowable, and the jury need not explain or defend
its conclusions.7 In short, the general verdict system gives the jury almost
unlimited power.8
The special interrogatory, which evolved from the practice of early English
common-law judges in quizzing the jurors on the grounds of their verdict, 9
'Wicker, Special Interrogatories to juries in Civil Cases, 35 Yale L.J. 296 (1926); Sunderland, Verdicts General and Special, 29 Yale L.J. 253 (1920); McCormick, jury Verdicts Upon
Special Questions in Civil Cases, 9J.Bar A.D.C. 5i (1942); Frank, Courts on Trial io8 et seq.
(i949); Ferderer v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 75 N.D. 139,42 N.W. 2d 216 (195o); State v. Layton, 147 S.W. 2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App., 1941). The turnabout in philosophy has not been complete, however. Associate justice Rossman of the Oregon supreme court declared: "Today trial
by jury is one of our most important democratic institutions.... The jury represents the common feeling of the community.... It is a shock absorber." The Judge-Jury Relationship in
the State Courts, 3 F.R.D. 98 (1944).
3Wicker, Special Interrogatories to juries in Civil Cases, 35 Yale L.J. 296 (1926); Frank,
Courts on Trial io8 et seq. (1949).
4 Wicker, Special Interrogatories to juries in Civil Cases, 35 Yale L.J. 296 (1926).
sGreen, A New Development in jury Trial, 13 A.B.A.J. 71S (1927); Coffman, Should the
General Verdict in Civil Cases be Abolished?, ii Neb. L. Bull. 260 (1932); Dooley, The Use
of Special Issues under the New State and Federal Rules, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 32 (ii);
Frank,
Courts on Trial xo8 et seq. (1949).
6Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 Yale L.j. 253 (1920). Some legal writers,
however, have considered this the very essence of trial by jury. Wigmore stated: "The jury
and the secrecy of the jury room, are the indispensable elements in popular justice.... The
jury, in the privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to the justice of the particular case...
." A Program for the Trial of jury Trial, 12 J. Am. Jud. Soc. i66, 170 (1929).
Roscoe Pound declared that: "Jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual administration... .'Law in the Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12, 18 (i9o).
7Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 Yale L.J. 253 (1920).
8It has been claimed, with some justification, that the instructions of the court are little
more than abstruse ritual. Driver, A More Extended Use of the Special Verdict, 9 F.R.D. 495
(i95o); Green, A New Development in jury Trial, 13 A.B.A.J. 715 (1927). Within a few moments, the jury must bite off, swallow, and assimilate whole chunks of complicated legal principles. In the oft-quoted words of Edson Sunderland, "T]welve men can misunderstand more
law in a minute than the judge can explain in an hour." Verdicts, General and Special, 29
Yale L.J. 253, 259 (1920).

Mayor and Burgesses of Devizes v. Clark, 3 A. & E. 506 (K.B., 1835); Hawkins, Pleas of
the Crown, Bk. 2, Ch. 22, § 22 (1824); Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special
Interrogatories, 32 Yale L.J. 575 (1923).
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is a technique devised to circumvent the alleged shortcomings of the general
verdict system.' 0 Special interrogatories are questions submitted to the jury
by the court, along with the general instructions,z in order to ascertain what
are termed the "ultimate and determinative" facts."1 These so-called "special
questions" may be proposed to the jury at the discretion of the court or at the
request of the parties, although submission is not mandatory in most jurisdictions.3
'aSpecial interrogatories are authorized by statute in the following states: Ariz. Code Ann.
(1939) §§ 21-10-9, 21-ioio; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §§ 27-1740, 27-1741; Cal. Code Civ. Proc.

(Deering, 1949) § 625; Rev. Gen. Stat. Conn. (1949) § 7973; Idaho Code Ann. (947) § o-22o;
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1948) c. 11o, § i89; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 2-2021, 22022; Iowa Rules Civ. Proc. (1943) 205, 206; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935) § 60-2918; Mich.
Stat. Ann. (Henderson, 1938) § 27.019; Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1949) § 546.20; Mont. Rev. Code
Ann. (1947) § 93-5202; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §§ 25-1r20, 25-X121; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hilyer,
1929) § 8778; N.M. Stat. Ann. (i94i) § i9-iol (49); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Cahill, r939)
§ 459; N.C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, 1943) §§ 1-202, 1-203; N.D. Rev. Code (x943) § 28-i5o3; Ohio
Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1948) §§ 11420-I7,1142o-i8; Okla. Stat. (i94) tit. 12, §§ 588, 589;
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (i94o) §§ 5-4o3, 5-404; R.I. Gen. Laws (938) C. 534, § 2; S.C. Code of
Laws (1942) c. 31, §§ 602, 603; S.D. Code Ann. (1939) § 33-133o; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie,
1938) § 10346; Tex. Rules Civ. Proc. (Vernon, 1941) 277, 279; Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933)
§§ 104-25-1, X04-25-2; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) §§ 364,,365; W.Va. Code Ann.
(Michie, 1949) § 5639; Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1949) §§ 270.27, 270.30; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(Courtright, 1945) §§ 3-2419, 3-242o. The Massachusetts courts have held that special interrogatories may be used in that state without express statutory provision. Burgess v. Giovanucci, 314 Mass. 252, 49 N.E. 2d 907 (I943).
1X"The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict,
written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a
verdict. The court shall give such explanation or instruction as may be necessary to enable the
jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and to render a general verdict. ... ." Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc. 49 (b).
12 Ipsen v. Ruess, 239 Iowa 1376,41 N.W. 2d 658 (i95o); Gearhart v. Columbus Ry., Power
&Light Co., 65 Ohio App. 225, 29 N.E. 2d 621 (1g4o); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Dunleavy,
129 Ill. 132, 22 N.E. 15 (i889); cf. Cherry v. Andrews, 231 N.C. 261, 56 S.E. 2d 703 (i95o).
"If the questionable word or phrase in the interrogatory calls upon the jury to use only the
'common use' or 'dictionary' definition to ascertain its meaning, the interrogatory asks for a
finding of fact. However, if the.., word or phrase requires from the court an instruction as to
its legal meaning, the interrogatory asks for a conclusion of mixed law and fact." Tucker
Freight Lines v. Gross, rog Ind. App. 454, 459, 33 N.E. 2d 353, 355 (94), following Dodge
Mfg. Co. v. Kronewitter, 57 Ind. App. 19o, 1O4 N.E. 99 (i914). The ultimate and determinative fact is that fact which has been reached by the process of logical reasoning from the detailed or probative fact. Since the conclusions of law are the next logical step in this process,
the ultimate and determinative facts lie in a more or less indefinable zone in between. Oliver
v. Coffman, IX2 Ind. App. 507,45 N.E. 2d 351 (1942).
13In the federal courts submission is within the broad discretion of the trial judge, Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc. 49 (b). The same is true in those states whose statutes are based on the
Federal Rules. Ariz. Code Ann. (939) §§ 21-1009, 21-ioio; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) § 28-1503.
In other jurisdictions the statutes expressly provide that submission is mandatory: Ill. Ann.
Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1948) c. 11o, § x8g; Iowa Rules Civ. Proc. (1943) 206; Lid. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933) § 2-2022. In the following cases, submission of properly framed interrogatories
was held to be mandatory, though not expressly so provided in the statutes: Zucker v. Karpeles, 88 Mich. 413, 50 N.W. 373 (z89I); Walker v. New Mexico & S.P. R. CO., 7 N.M. 282,
34 Pac. 43 (1893), aff'd 165 U.S. 593 (z897); Pecsok v. Millikin, 36 Ohio App. 543, 173 N.E.
626 (i93o); Doyle v. Ralph, 49 R.I. 155, 141 Atl. i8o (1928). The following statutes declare
that it is within the discretion of the trial judge, whether or not he will submit special inter-
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The jury's answers to special interrogatories are not given in lieu of a general
verdict. In theory, at least, they are intended to check the correctness of the
general verdict.'4 In practice, the use of special interrogatories could result in
the shift of considerable power from the jury to the judge. When the judge has
before him a general verdict and special findings, it is within his power to decide
whether the two are consistent or in conflict. If he decides that they are in
conflict and cannot reasonably be reconciled, then the special findings will control, and he may give judgment notwithstanding the general verdict.5 Thus,
while special interrogatories do not directly check the correctness of the general
verdict, they do provide the judge with a tool by means of which he may curb
the jury's power.
The value of the special interrogatory thus hinges considerably on the amount
of discretion which the courts allow themselves in dealing with the resolution
of inconsistencies between special findings and general verdicts. This is highlighted by the decision of the Ohio supreme court in McNees v. Cincinnati
Street Ry. Co., 6
Plaintiff's decedent, an employee of defendant street railway company, suffered an attack of coronary thrombosis which resulted in his subsequent death,
while operating one of defendant's trolley busses during a heavy fog. Decedent's
wife sued under the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act, which makes comrogatories to the jury: Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) § 27-1740; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1949)
§ 625; Rev. Gen. Stat. Conn. (1949) § 7973, construed in Callahan v. Jursek, ioo Conn. 490,
124 Atl. 31 (1924); Idaho Code Ann. (1947) § 10-220; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935) § 6o-2918,
construed in Atchison T. & S.F. R. Co. v. Ayers, 56 Kan. 176,42 Pac. 722 (1895); Minn. Stat.
(Mason, 1949) § 546.20; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) § 93-5202; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) § 251121, construed in Buel v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 81 Neb. 430, 116 N.W. 299 (19o8); Nev.
Comp. Laws (H1ilyer, 1929) § 8778; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Cahill, ig39) § 459; N.C. Gen. Stat.
(Michie, 1943) § 1-203; Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 12, § 588, construed in Root v. Coyle, 15 Okla.
362, 82 Pac. 648 (I9O5); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (i94o) § 5-403, construed in Herrlin v. Brown
& McCabe, 71 Ore. 470, 142 Pac. 772 (1914); S.C. Code of Laws (1942) c. 3 i , § 602; S.D. Code
Ann. (i939) § 33-133o; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 10346; Tex. Rules Civ. Proc. (Vernon, 1941) 279; Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (i933) § 104-25-2, construed in Prye v. Kalbaugh, 34
Utah 3o6, 97 Pac. 331 (i9o8); Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 364, construed in
Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 Pac. 265 (1930); W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1949)
§ 5639, construed in Lovett v. Lisagor, ioo W.Va. 154, 130 S.E. 125 (1920); Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1949) § 270.27; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1945) § 3-2419, construed in Optiz v.
Newcastle, 35 Wyo. 358, 249 Pac. 799 (1926).
14 Anderson v. Johnson Co., i5o Ohio St. 169, 8o N.E. 2d 757 (1948); Long v. Shafer, 162
Kan. 21, 174 P. 2d 88 (1946). "The final conclusion of a jury is expressed in their general verdict, and special findings are permitted only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the jury
have considered and found the elemental ingredients which should inhere in and support their
general verdict." Neiswender v. Board of County Comm'rs, 153 Kan. 634, 638, 113 P.
2d 115, 119 (1941). Clementson described the special interrogatory as "a sort of 'exploratory
opening' into the abdominal cavity of the general verdict ... by which the court determines
whether the organs are sound and in place and the proper treatment to be pursued." Special
Verdicts and Special Findings by Juries 45, 46 (1905).
'5 Statutes cited note io supra.
16152 Ohio St. 269, 89 N.E. 2d 138 (p949).
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pensable any injury received in the course of and arising out of, an injured
party's employment. The jury entered a general verdict for defendant, while
answering affirmatively the following interrogatory:
"Was the cause of Taylor McNees' death, the mental strain and excitement
of the driving conditions which prevailed as he drove the trolley bus on the
night of January 17, I944?'' x
It was held on appeal, reversing the judgment of the trial court in granting
plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, that the general
verdict and the special finding, though apparently in conflict, were not irreconcilable; the special finding, while establishing a causal connection between
plaintiff's employment and his injuries, did not establish a "proximate causal
relationship between decedent's employment and either the mental strain and
excitement, or the coronary thrombosis, or his death."' 8
In reaching this decision, the Ohio court applied two intimately connected
rules: (i) The answers of a jury to special interrogatories will not authorize a
judgment different from that authorized by a general verdict, where such
answers can be reconciled with the general verdict,/9 and (2) the answers of a
X7Ibid., at 272 and 141.
isIbid., at 274 and 142.
19Fralick v. Kan. City Pub. Serv. Co., 168 Kan. 134, 211 P. 2d 443 (i949);
Klever v. Reid
Bros. Express, rxi Ohio St. 467, 86 N.E. 2d 6o8 (i949); Ind. Water Co. v. Schoeneman, 107
Ind.App. 308, 2o N.E. 2d 671 (1939); Lowen v. Finnila, 102 P. 2d 520 (Cal., i94o); Gesauldi v.
Conn. Co., 131 Conn. 622, 41 A. 2d 771 (i945); Fischer v. Hawkeye States, 37 N.W. 2d
284
(Iowa, 1949); Voelkel v. Bennett, 31 F. Supp. 5o6 (Pa., 194o); Wayne v. N.Y. Life Ins.
Co.,
2 F.R.D. 203 (Mo., 1942). According to Rule 49 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,

interrogatories which are inconsistent with themselves cannot control the general verdict. This
is also stated expressly in the statutes of those states which follow the Federal Rules. Ariz. Code
Ann. (1939) § 21-1oio; Iowa Rules Civ. Proc. (1943) 2o6; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) § 28-1503.
Generally, however, the courts consider the special findings as a whole in determining whether
or not conflict exists between them and the general verdict. This was exemplified in Republic
Creosoting Co. v. Hiatt, 212 Ind. 432, 8 N.E. 2d 98i (1937), in which the court found it possible to reconcile the following special findings:
"Q. i. Was the plaintiff working as an employee of the defendant on Jan. 31, 1929, in loading
blocks? Ans. Yes."
"Q. 2. Were the injuries, of which he now complains caused by so working with creosoted
blocks on Jan. 31, i929? Ans. No."
"Q. 3. Was the plaintiff working as an employee of the defendant in sacking blocks on Feb.
2, 1929? Ans. Yes."
"Q-4. Were the injuries of which he now complains caused by so working with creosoted
blocks on Feb. 2, 1929? Ans. No."
"Q. 5.Did the injuries of which he now complains arise out of his work in loading blocks on
Jan. 31, 1929. Ans. Yes."
"Q. 6. Did the injuries of which he now complains, arise out of his work in sacking blocks on
Feb.

2,

929? Ans. Yes."

The general verdict had been for the plaintiff. The court managed to reconcile these answers on
the grounds that plaintiff was attempting to recover on the theory that his injuries were due to
his being poisoned by fumes from the creosoted blocks, and since interrogatories five and six
did not include the word creosoted, they were not in conflict with two and four. Compare
Bickel, Judge and Jury-Inconsistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 649
(195o). It is interesting to note that, in reconciling these special findings, the court overturned
the general verdict.
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jury to special interrogatories will not control the general verdict so as to authorize judgment notwithstanding the verdict, unless the answers in themselves show that, as a matter of law, judgment could only be rendered for the
party against whom the general verdict has been found.20
As will be shown, the first rule expresses a complex of principles by which the
courts resolve inconsistencies between general verdicts and special findings..In
2
applying it, the courts presume everything which will support the former,' and
nothing which will support the latter. The general verdict is considered to
import a finding on all questions not inconsistent with the answers to the special
interrogatories.23 If under the issues presented, facts could have been found
which were not in conflict with the special findings, and which would support
the general verdict, the latter will prevail.24 Where the jury's answer to a special interrogatory is open to two constructions, one harmonizing, the other conflicting with the general verdict, the court must apply the harmonizing construction.2S

In the ordinary course of events, the application of the reconciliation principle is sound. There is no valid reason why a general verdict should be overturned because of minor inconsistencies between it and the special findings.
However, the strong presumption in favor of the general verdict, reflected in
the McNees case, is not in accord with one of the principles underlying special
interrogatories. In theory, at least, it should be simpler for the jury to give correct and intelligent answers to concise questions of fact, than to render an allinclusive general verdict.26 Most important, when the courts apply this prin20Wayne v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 2 F.R.D. 202 (Mo., i942); Gesauldi v. Conn. Co., 131 Conn.
A. 2d 771 (2945); Lowen v. Finnila, 102 P. 2d 520 (Cal., i94o); cf. Sohler v. Christen-

622, 41

sen, i5x Neb. 843, 39 N.W. 2d 837 (i949).
21Jelf v. Cottonwood Falls Co., x62 Kan. 713, 178 P. 2d 992 (i947); Gesauldi v. Conn. Co.,
131 Conn. 622, 41 A. 2d 771 (1945); Wayne v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 2 F.R.D. 202 (Mo., 1942).
But cf. New St. Anthony Hotel Co. v. Pryor, 132 S.W. 2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939).
- It was held, however, in Harbin v. Beaumont, 146 S.W. 2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App., 194o),

that where a special finding conflicts with a general finding, the latter will be treated as a mere
legal conclusion, the effect of which is destroyed by an adverse special finding of controlling
fact upon which that conclusion rests.
23Bolan v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 167 F. 2d 934 (C.A. 2d, 1948); Giltner v. Stephens, z66
Kan. 172, 200 P. 2d 290 (1948); Oliver v. Coffman, 112 ind. App. 507,45 N.E. 2d 351 (1942).

24Theurer v. Holland Furnace Co., 124 F. 2d 494 (C.A. ioth, 1941); Jelf v. Cottonwood
Falls Gas Co., 162 Kan. 713, 178 P. 2d 992 (i947); Neuwelt v. Roush, 85 N.E. 2d 506 (Ind.
App., 1949); Lowen v. Finnila, 102 P. 2d 520 (Cal., I94O).

25Theurer v. Holland Furnace Co., 124 F. 2d 494 (C.A. ioth, I94r); Hill v. Leichliter, 168
Kan. 85, 271 P. 2d 433 (1949); cf. Klever v. Reid Bros. Express, i5 Ohio St. 467, 86 N.E.
2d 6o8 (i949).
26Significant restrictions are placed upon ,the interrogatories which may be submitted to

the jury. They must be simple, direct, and should comprise only a single issue. Tucker Freight
Lines v. Gross, iog Ind. App. 454, 33 N.E. 2d 353 (1941); Ipsen v. Ruess, 239 Iowa 1376, 35
N.W. 2d 82 (1948). They should not ask for mixed conclusions of fact and law, but only for the
"ultimate and determinative" facts (see note 13 supra). Nor should they be phrased so as to
confuse and mislead the jury. Anderson v. Johnson Co., i5o Ohio St. 16q, 8o N.E. 2d 757
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ciple, they derogate from the power given them by the special interrogatory
system. By presuming in favor of the general verdict, and seeking every conceivable means to reconcile the special findings with it, the courts return to the
jury most of its original power.
The second rule, like the first, is a reasonable one when taken at its face
value. However, if strictly applied, it could lead to the submission of vast numbers of interrogatories.27 One court has held that, in the case of conflict, special
findings will not control the general verdict unless they "cover every essential
element of the case."2S
Furthermore, rule two has an intimate connection with rule one. In effect,
it is little more than an extension of the presumption principle.9
The operation of these two rules can best be demonstrated by a closer analysis of the McNees case. The Ohio court had before it a general verdict for the
defendant, and a special finding, which on its face at least, was in direct conflict with the verdict. Impliedly, though not avowedly using the presumption
principle, the court attempted to reconcile the two.3 0 It seems reasonable to in(1948). But see Gulf, C. &S.F. Ry. Co. v. Guin, 131 Tex. 548, i6 S.W. 2d 693 (x938), in which

the court approved the following interrogatory: "Do you find from a preponderance of evidence that the deceased's death was not the result of an unavoidable accident... ?"This question contains a double negative, requiring an affirmative word to give a negative answer. If
the special questions are ambiguous, they will be construed against the submitting party.
Klever v. Reid Bros. Express, 151 Ohio St. 467, 86 N.E. 2d 6o8 (I949); Brittain v. Wichita
Falls Forwarding Co., i68 Kan. '45, 211 P. 2d 77 (i949). In some states, interrogatories may
not be based on the evidence, but only on the pleadings. Olsburg State Bank v. Anderson, 157
Kan. 463, 142 P. 2d 712 (1943); Gearhart v. Columbus Ry., P. &L. Co., 65 Ohio App. 225, 29
N.E. 2d 621 (i94o); Norwalk Truck Line v. Kostka, 88 N.E. 2d 799 (Ind., i949). Contra:
Crouse v. Vernon, 232 N.C. 24, 59 S.E. 2d i85 (i95o); Kiel v. Mahan, 214 S.W. 2d 865 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1949); Green, A New Development in jury Trial, 13 A.B.A.J. 715 (1927). But see

Thomas, The Use in State Court Practice of Special Findings of Fact,

20

Ohio Bar 421,

426

(1950).
27With each party attempting to set forth all possible bases for recovery, the system can
become unwieldy, as was the experience in the early use of the Texas special issue submission
practice. Dooley, The Use of Special Issues Under the New State and Federal Rules, 2o Tex.
L. Rev. 32 (194r). This is limited, however, by counsel's practical consideration of trial technique. One lawyer has said: "[A]bout the only thing the special interrogatories, submitted at
the request of the plaintiff can do for him in the ordinary negligence case, is to upset a verdict
in his favor, if it is found on appeal that they should not have been given." Thomas, The Use
in State Court Practice of Special Findings of Fact, 20 Ohio Bar 421, 422 (x95o).
2Wayne v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 2 F.R.D. 202 (Mo., 1942).
29Perhaps a better rule would be that judgment on the verdict is subject to reversal when it
is apparent that the special findings which conflict with the general verdict determined that verdict. Compare Feldmann v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 142 F. 2d 628 (C.A. 8th, i944).
3o The court admitted that there was "no statutory provision requiring a proximate causal
relationship between a compensable injury and a death for which compensation is sought."
152 Ohio St. 269, 275, 89 N.E. 2d 138, 142 (I949). It then cited cases holding such a relationship
was necessary, and others which did not refer expressly to such a necessity. The court thon
distinguished the latter cases on the ground that in none of them did the courts determine that
such a relationship was not necessary. Assuming that this somewhat dubious argument is
correct, and that it was necessary for plaintiff to establish a proximate relationship in order to
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fer from the majority opinion, that had counsel for the plaintiff used the word
"proximate" in his interrogatory, the court would have found the conflict between the jury's answer and its general verdict irreconcilable, and that, as a
matter of law, plaintiff would have been entitled to judgment in his favor.
However, the question remains: would the jury have understood the concept
of "proximate cause" (providing of course, that the court had not then held the
interrogatory improper, as requiring a conclusion of mixed fact and law).3'
The concept of proximate cause is not a simple one. According to Prosser,
"there is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion."' 32
Furthermore, the trial court would not have been justified in helping the jury
to answer this interrogatory by means of appropriate explanation.33 The same
court which decided the McNees case held, in Bradley v. Mansfield Rapid Tranrecover, the jury's special finding may most reasonably be read to establish just such a relationship. The dissenting judge declared, "it seems to me that when the jury found that 'the
mental strain and excitement of the driving conditions which prevailed as he drove the trolley
bus' caused McNees' death, it necessarily found that such 'mental strain and excitement of
the driving conditions' were incidents and risks of ... [the] employment in which he was then
engaged. ... From a common-experience rather than a metaphysical approach, this record
discloses that these conditions would arise from no other source than his employment." 152
Ohio St. 269, 283, 89 N.E. 2d 138, 146 (io9o).
3"In City of Troy v. Brady, 67 Ohio St. 65, 65 N.E. 616 (1902), the court held that an interrogatory using the phrase "reasonably safe" was not improper. However, the following interrogatory was declared improper: "22. Could the driver of the automobile, John Challek,
have seen the truck in time to have stopped the automobile, had he looked with reasonable
care?" Tucker Freight Lines v. Gross, 2o9 Ind. App. 454, 33 N.E. 2d 353 (1941). The court followed Dodge Mg. Co. v. Kronewitter, 57 Ind. App. i9 o , i98, 104 N.E. 99, 102 (194i), declaring that the interrogatory would have been proper had counsel substituted for "reasonable
care," "the care which an ordinarily prudent person would have used under the same or similar circumstance." In Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Dunleavy, 129 Ill. 132, 22 N.E. i5 (1889),
the court, in submitting defendant's interrogatory, changed the form from "What precaution
did the deceased take to inform himself of the approach of the train which caused the injury?"
to "Was the deceased exercising reasonable care for his own safety at the time he was killed?"
Held, modification was proper, since the original question sought to obtain a finding as to
probative or evidentiary, instead of material facts. The court in the Dodge case held that
jurors should not be required to answer questions of mixed law and fact, because they "are
presumed not to know the standard; and if they should answer such a question, the court could
not know whether they applied the correct legal standard in reaching their conclusion, or
whether they reached it by applying some standard of their own, not in accordance with the
standard fixed by law." Although the reasonable man is undoubtedly an entity created by law,
it is doubtful whether or not the common-sense, common-experience view which a jury
would take when faced with this concept is far different from the legal standard. The jury
need have done no more than apply the "common use" or "dictionary" sense of the word
reasonable, to have arrived at a justifiable decision. Note 12 supra.
32Prosser, Torts 311 et seq. (2942); Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat
from Rationalization, 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 36 (2938).
33 A trial judge has no authority to require the jury to revise or reframe its answer to an
interrogatory, when the intention of the jury may be obtained from the answer given, nor
can the court indicate to the jury the answer to be returned. Elio v. Akron Transportation Co.,
147 Ohio St. 363, 71 N.E. 2d 707 (1947). Contra: Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 49 (b); Tex. Rules
Civ. Proc. (Vernon, 1942) 279.

COMMENTS

sif,34 that a trial judge could not properly explain the meaning of "direct
cause," a term which the court equated with "proximate cause," to the jury.3S
However, even had the jury completely understood the concept of proximate
catuse, and had the plaintiff so worded his interrogatory, it is doubtful whether
this would have made any difference in the jury's answer. Under commonsense principles, one cannot attribute to the jury a subtlety of thought which
would distinguish between remote and proximate cause.36 When the jury
answered plaintiff's interrogatory, it almost assuredly did so with regard to what
it considered not "a" cause, but "the" cause.
Thus, in applying the rules of interpretation outlined above, the Ohio court
twisted the jury's special finding into a form completely alien to its plain and
simple meaning. So long as the courts carry the reconciliation doctrine to the
lengths it was carried in the McNees case, the value of the special interrogatory
as a check on the power of the jury in rendering a general verdict will be greatly
reduced, if not completely subverted.

STATE REGULATION OF NONRESIDENT ALIEN
INHERITANCE-AN ANOMALY IN
FOREIGN POLICY
Any discussion of the right of nonresident aliens to inherit American property
elicits several conflicting considerations. Everyone agrees that, with some exceptions, a testator should be permitted to dispose of his possessions in any way he
chooses, and that the interest of a beneficiary should be protected.' However,
a feeling persists that devises and bequests should not be permitted to enrich
'54 Ohio St. 154, 93 N.E. 2d 672 (195o).
3s The trial court had submitted the following interrogatories:
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"No. x-Do you find the driver of the bus was negligent?"
"No. 2-If the answer to interrogatory No. i is 'yes,' of what did his negligence consist?"
"No. 5-Do you find that the plaintiff, Charles Daniel Brady was negligent in any respect
which was the direct cause of his injuries?"
"No. 6-If the answer to interrogatory No. 5 is 'yes,' of what did his negligence consist?"
The jury answered No. i, "Yes." The answer to No. 2 was, "negligence on the part of the
defendant that door of bus was accidentally opened." No. 5 was answered "Yes," and No. 6,
"We find plaintiff was negligent to a lesser degree than defendant, due to his position in the
bus." The trial judge then informed the jury that there was no apportionment of negligence
in Ohio, and also explained the concept of direct cause. He requested that the jury reconsider
and revise its answer to the sixth interrogatory. The foreman asked for interrogatory five as
well, stating: "We didn't understand interrogatory No. 5 about the direct cause." The jury
then returned with a negative answer to five, making it unnecessary to answer the sixth question. The supreme court held that the judge's explanations were improper and granted a new
trial.
36 The statement of the dissenting judge is instructive here. Note 30 supra.
'See McMurray, Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon, i4 Ili. L.
Rev. 536 (igig).

